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Abstract
With growing interest in adversarial machine learning, it
is important for practitioners and users of machine learn-
ing to understand how their models may be attacked. We
present a web-based visualization tool, ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND, to demonstrate the efficacy of common
adversarial methods against a convolutional neural net-
work. ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND provides users an
efficient and effective experience in exploring algorithms
for generating adversarial examples — samples crafted
by an adversary to fool a machine learning system. To
enable fast and accurate responses to users, our webapp
employs two key features: (1) We split the visualization
and evasive sample generation duties between client and
server while minimizing the transferred data. (2) We in-
troduce a variant of the Jacobian Saliency Map Approach
that is faster and yet maintains a comparable evasion rate
1.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks (CNNs) are an essential tool for many
machine learning tasks, especially image classification
[6]. Unfortunately, recent studies of evasive samples
show that intelligent attackers can force these models to
misclassify samples by performing nearly imperceptible
modifications to the sample before attempting classifica-
tion [5, 10]. These samples are usually crafted through
an optimization procedure that searches for small and ef-
fective perturbations (details in Section 2). We introduce
a visualization tool that enables deep learning practition-
ers and users to understand how their classifiers may be
attacked.
Investigating the behavior of machine learning sys-
tems in adversarial environments is an emerging topic at
1Project source code and data from our experiments is available at
https://github.com/QData/AdversarialDNN-Playground.
the junction of machine learning and computer security
[2]. While machine learning models may appear to be
effective for many security tasks like malware classifica-
tion [7] and face recognition [9], it is important to realize
that these classification techniques were not designed to
withstand manipulations made by intelligent and adap-
tive adversaries. In contrast with applications of machine
learning to other fields, security tasks involve adversaries
that may respond maliciously to the classifier [2]. There-
fore, we seek to provide an educational tool for visualiz-
ing adversarial examples generated by common evasion
attacks and showing how these examples fool a state-of-
the-art CNN model.
Our proposed package follows the spirit of Tensor-
Flow Playground — a web-based educational tool that
helps users understand how neural networks work [11].
TensorFlow Playground has been used in many classes as
a pedagogical aid and helps the self-guided student learn
more. Its impact inspires us to visualize adversarial sam-
ples with a similar tool, which we call “ADVERSARIAL-
PLAYGROUND.” This web-based visualization tool as-
sists users in understanding and comparing the impact
of standard evasion techniques on deep learning mod-
els. ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND provides quick and
effective visualizations of adversarial examples through
two key methods:
Client/Server Framework Launching
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND starts a lightweight
Python webserver that hosts a collection of pages for the
visualizations. Using a server-based approach allows
remote hosting on a powerful machine, but the tool
may be hosted on any computer running TensorFlow.
To improve response time, the server does not transmit
large images of evasive samples to the client, sending
only a matrix describing the sample and the vector
of classifications; the graphics are rendered on the
client-side using JavaScript. This design differs from
TensorFlow Playground, which solely used client-side
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technology with no server-side computations.
Modified JSMA We introduce a new, faster variant of
the Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) that main-
tains a comparable evasion rate to the original. Most
state-of-the-art evasion algorithms are slow due to expen-
sive optimization and the large feature space involved in
image classification [3, 4]. For studies focusing only on
effectiveness of attack, this is not a major issue. In our
application, however, slow visualizations will negatively
impact users. Instead of performing a costly search of all
feature pairs (as in JSMA), we use a heuristic approxi-
mation to reduce the search space considerably. Exper-
iments verify that our faster JSMA maintains the same
evasion rate as the usual JSMA algorithm, but executes
almost twice as fast.
The rest of this paper takes the following structure:
Section 2 discusses three types of state-of-the-art evasion
algorithms, Section 3 introduces the system organization
and software design of ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND,
Section 4 presents the altered JSMA algorithm with an
empirical comparison to cleverhans JSMA, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper by discussing possible exten-
sions.
2 Background of Adversarial Examples
Studies regarding the behavior of machine learning mod-
els in adversarial environments generally fall into one
of three categories: (1) poisoning attacks, in which spe-
cially crafted samples are injected into the training of a
learning model, (2) privacy-aware methods, which aim
to preserve the privacy of information in training data, or
(3) evasion attacks, in which the adversary aims to cre-
ate inputs that are misclassified by a target classifier. Our
work focuses on evasion attacks.
The goal of evasion is to craft an input for a particular
classifier that, while improperly classified, reveals only
slight alteration to a human viewer. To formalize the ex-
tent of allowed alteration, evasion algorithms minimize
the difference between the “seed” image and the result-
ing evasive sample based on a selected norm (distance
function).
In some cases, the adversary specifies the “target”
class of an evading sample — for example, the adversary
may desire an image that looks like a “5” to be classi-
fied as a “7”. This is referred to as a targeted approach.
Conversely, if the adversary does not specify the desired
class, the algorithm is considered to be untargeted.
Formally, let us denote f : X→C to be a classifier that
maps the set of all possible inputs, X , to some finite set
of classes, C. Then, given a target class yt ∈ C, a start-
ing sample x ∈ X , and a norm ‖ · ‖, the goal of targeted
adversarial sample generation is to find x′ ∈ X such that:
x′ = argmin
s∈X
{‖x− s‖ : f (s) = yt} (1)
Similarly, in the untargeted case, the goal is to find x′
such that:
x′ = argmin
s∈X
{‖x− s‖ : f (s) 6= f (x)} (2)
In this formalization, we see there are two key degrees
of freedom in creating a new evasion algorithm: targeted
vs. untargeted attacks and the choice of norm. The latter
category provides a useful classification scheme for eva-
sion algorithms, suggested by Carlini and Wagner [3].
2.1 L0 Norm
A simple way to determine the extent of the difference
between two images is to count the number of pixels that
differ between them. That is, if x is our original image,
and x′ = x+ r is the evading image (for some suitable
value of r), then we can compute the L0 distance between
x and x′ as following, where [·] is the Iverson bracket2:
‖r‖0 =∑
i
[ri 6= 0] (3)
Papernot, et al., suggested using the L0 norm for eval-
uating the similarity of the initial sample and adversarial
result [8]. Their approach computes a saliency map of a
given input, ranking pixels based on their contribution to
classification. Then, they perform a combinatorial search
over all pixel pairs to find the optimal two pixels to ad-
just. This is repeated until either the modified image is
misclassified or the L0 distance between the modified and
unmodified image is exceeds a threshold.
This algorithm — as well as the L∞ fast gradient sign
method — was included in the cleverhans package by
Goodfellow, Papernot, and McDaniel [4]. The specifics
of this algorithm will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 4.1.
2.2 L2 Norm
A disadvantage of the L0 norm is that it is not differen-
tiable. Since the L2 norm is differentiable, it is more eas-
ily understood from a theoretical standpoint. This norm
measures the standard Euclidean distance between two
vectors; using the same notation as before, with x as the
2The Iverson bracket is defined as follows: [P] =
{
1 P is true
0 otherwise
2
starting vector and x′ = x+ r for the adversarial input,
this norm is computed by:
‖r‖2 =
(
∑
i
r2i
)1/2
(4)
In their foundational paper on evasive sample gener-
ation, Szegedy, et al., posed the issue as a convex opti-
mization problem using the L2 norm [10]. This problem
was then solved using the usual (albeit slow) method of
box-constrained L-BFGS.
2.3 L∞ Norm
A third commonly used norm is the L∞ norm, also called
the Chebyshev distance. This measures the maximal
change between two vectors along any single feature.
That is, if x is the starting vector and x′ = x+ r is the ad-
versarial input, the distance between them is computed
by:
‖r‖∞ = max
i
{|ri|} (5)
The Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method uses the L∞
norm in generating evading inputs; this method is com-
monly used due to its speed [5]. Unlike most prior ap-
proaches, which require iteratively changing the evasive
sample away from its source class, FGS performs exactly
one update step to obtain the evasive input. Informally,
the algorithm performs one step of gradient descent, but
(1) moves away from the loss function’s minimum and
(2) modifying the input sample rather than the model
weights.
If x is our original input, J(θ ,x,y) is the cost function
for training the network, and x′ is the evading input cre-
ated by FGS, we have:
x′ = x+ ε sign(∇xJ(θ ,x,y)) (6)
The attacking power, ε , may be adjusted to fit the par-
ticular domain. Increasing ε increases likelihood that the
evading sample is misclassified, but it also increases L∞
distance between x and x′. This presentation of FGS is
untargeted; this algorithm only cares about getting fur-
ther away from the source class but does not specify any
“target” class.
3 System Organization: Webserver with
Client-side Visualization
As a web application, ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND
splits the duties of visualization and computation be-
tween the client and server. Through the client, the user
adjusts hyperparameters and submits an AJAX request
Figure 1: System Interaction
for a generated sample to the server. Once the Tensor-
Flow backend generates the adversarial image and clas-
sification likelihoods, the server returns this data to the
client. Finally, this information is displayed graphically
to the user through use of the Plotly JavaScript library
(Figure 1).
When the application is accessed, the user is pre-
sented with the choice between several attack methods
— some targeted and some untargeted. After selecting
an attack, the user may adjust model parameters, choose
the seed image, and specify a target class (if applica-
ble). When the user submits their desired parameters, the
server starts the creation of an adversarial sample against
a pretrained CNN model written with the TensorFlow li-
brary.
Using TensorFlow utilizes the GPU of the server to
quickly return results to the client, even if the client is
a lesser-powered machine than the server. Evading sam-
ples are generated in real time (rather than returning a
precomputed result), so the user may experience a delay
if the attack they selected is particularly slow. The result-
ing adversarial sample and likelihoods for each class are
displayed to the user through client-side code.
3.1 Design Decisions
In creating our system, we made several design de-
cisions. Here, we present the reasoning behind the
three largest system-level decisions we made: building
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND as a web-based applica-
tion, utilizing both client- and server-side code, and ren-
dering images with the client rather than the server.
3.1.1 Web-based Framework
The first question we asked was whether we wanted a
web-capable framework or a desktop application. This
3
Figure 2: ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND User Interface
(a) Adversarial and Original Sample
(b) Classification likelihoods
was a fairly simple design choice, as a web-based inter-
face enables a large number of users to utilize the appli-
cation without requiring an installation process on each
computer. By eliminating an installation step, we en-
courage potential users who may be only casually inter-
ested in adversarial machine learning to explore what it
is. This supports the pedagogical goals of the software
package.
3.1.2 Client-Server with Python back-end
Beyond a web-based framework, we needed to de-
cide if ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND would be client-
based or if it would utilize server-side capabilities as
well. The TensorFlow Playground was written entirely
in JavaScript and other client-side technologies, allowing
a lightweight server to host the service for many users.
However, adversarial samples are usually generated on
larger, deeper networks than those created by users of
TensorFlow Playground, and this makes a JavaScript-
only approach prohibitively slow.
Instead, we chose to use a GPU-enabled server run-
ning Python with TensorFlow to generate the adversarial
samples. In addition to a speed advantage, this allows
our baseline CNN model to be easily replaced with other
TensorFlow graphs. Adding new attack strategies is sim-
pler, too, as TensorFlow has been used in many research
papers on evasion strategies.
3.1.3 Client-side rendering
Once we decided to generate the samples on the server-
side, it was tempting to generate the output images on
the server as well. This leads us to the third design de-
cision we made: client-side rendering of MNIST images
and likelihood plots. In our prototype, we used server-
side rendering of these images using the Python library
matplotlib, then loaded the image from the client di-
rectly.
However, this approach suffered from multiple disad-
vantages. Using only the default matplotlib utilities,
we would have to write every generated image to disk
and serve the unique URL to the user; this uses large
amounts of disk, depending on the number of users. Fur-
thermore, each image was around 20 kilobytes; waiting
for the image to transfer added to the latency experienced
by the user.
Fortunately, client-side rendering of images using the
JavaScript library Plotly.JS resolved both of these is-
sues. Rather than transferring an entire PNG image with
thousands of pixels, we send only the pixel values for
the 28× 28 MNIST images and the 10 values for clas-
sification likelihoods within the POST response to the
client. This reduced the amount of data we transferred
on each request which, in turn, significantly reduced the
time needed for each update. Additionally, this elimi-
nates the need for storing any produced image files on
the server. As a further advantage, the Plotly framework
allows interactive charts that display individual pixel val-
ues on mouseover, providing users with more detailed
feedback.
3.2 MNIST Dataset
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND uses the popular MNIST
“handwritten digits” dataset for visualizing evasion at-
tacks. This dataset contains 70,000 images of hand-
written digits (0 through 9). Of these, 60,000 images are
used as training data and the remaining 10,000 images
are used for testing. Each sample is a 28×28 pixel, 8-bit
grayscale image. Users of our system are presented with
a collection of multiple seed images, selected from each
4
of the 10 classes in the testing set3.
We decided to only support the MNIST dataset for
our visualization, as it is a common dataset used in eva-
sion discussions. Many adversarial machine learning pa-
pers work with some form of image data; since this is
easy to visually process, we thought it would be best
to work with one of the MNIST, CIFAR, or ImageNet
datasets. However, both ImageNet and CIFAR are much
higher-dimensional than MNIST, which means gener-
ating adversarial samples is a more time-intensive pro-
cess; the low-dimensionality of MNIST samples results
in very fast generation of evasive samples. To provide the
user with a low-latency yet representative experience, we
used MNIST.
3.3 Software Manual
We released all project code on GitHub in the interest
of providing a high-quality, easy-to-use software pack-
age to demonstrate evasion attacks. This section explains
how to set up and use the package.
Setup Although minimal, the package requires a com-
puter with Python 3.5, TensorFlow 1.0 (or higher), the
standard SciPy stack, and the Python package Flask.
We have tested the code on Windows, Linux, and Mac
operating systems.
To install, clone the GitHub repository and in-
stall the prerequisites via pip3 -r install
requirements.txt. A pre-trained MNIST model
is already stored in the GitHub repository; all that is
needed to start the webapp is to run python3 run.py.
Once the app is started, it will run on localhost:9000.
Usage To use the application, the user selects a model
from the navigation bar at the top of the webapp. On the
right-hand pane, the user sets the attacking strength the
algorithm using the slider, selects a seed image, and (if
applicable) a target class. (Figure 2a at right.) Selecting a
seed image immediately loads the image to the left-hand
display.
After setting the parameters, the user clicks “Update
Model.” This runs the adversarial algorithm in real-time
to attempt generating an evasive sample. The sample is
displayed in the primary pane to the left of the controls
(Figure 2a at left). This sample is fed through the clas-
sifier, and then the likelihoods are normalized and dis-
played in bar charts below the samples (Figure 2b). Fi-
nally, the classification of generated sample is displayed
below the controls at right.
3A short script is in the project GitHub repository for generating
new collections of seed images if the user runs the webapp locally.
4 Faster approach to JSMA
At the core of the ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND is a
set of pre-implemented attack models. It was important
to present the user with the choice between targeted and
untargeted approaches, as well as a choice between mod-
els utilizing different norms. As such, we implemented
saliency-map based approaches (one directly from Pa-
pernot, et al. [8] and a faster one of our own devel-
opment) for targeted methods and lightly modified the
cleverhans implementation of the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGS) for untargeted attacks.
As the FGS method is nearly identical to that found
in cleverhans, we encourage the reader to consider [4]
for implementation details. In the next two sections, we
will review the details of the Jacobian Saliency Map Ap-
proach from the work of Papernot, et al., [8] and our im-
provement, Fast Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori.
4.1 Jacobian Saliency Map Approach
(JSMA)
The Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) adjusts
the starting input to maintain similarity based on the L0.
Applied to the MNIST model, the approach is as follows:
1. Compute the forward derivative of the classifier,
∇F(X).
2. Use the saliency map of the sample to determine
two best pixels to adjust.
3. Modify the two pixels and update the current sam-
ple.
4. Repeat until adversarial sample is misclassified or
while the sample and the seed image differ by at
most ϒ (a tuneable threshold).
The first and last steps are fairly inexpensive in terms
of time; the largest computational difficulty from using
the saliency map to determine which pixels to adjust. In
their original paper, Papernot et al. used Algorithm 1 for
this selection process [8].
The key disadvantage of JSMA is that it must con-
sider all pairs (p,q) of possible feature indices (see Algo-
rithm 1). Thus, the loop must performΘ(|Γ|2) iterations,
where |Γ| is the available feature size of each sample.
When working on high-dimensional data, this becomes
prohibitively expensive. By using a heuristic approxima-
tion of the JSMA algorithm, we achieve a faster runtime
with comparable accuracy.
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Algorithm 1 Papernot’s Saliency Map Feature Selec-
tion
∇F(X) is the forward derivative, Γ the features still in the
search space, and t the target class
Input: ∇F(X), Γ, t
1: for each pair (p,q) ∈ Γ2, p 6= q do
2: α = ∑i=p,q
∂Ft (X)
∂Xi
3: β = ∑i=p,q∑ j 6=t
∂F j(X)
∂Xi
4: if α < 0 and β > 0 and −α×β > max then
5: p1, p2← p,q
6: max←−α×β
7: end if
8: end for
9: return p1, p2
4.2 Fast Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori
(FJSMA)
Our improved JSMA is inspired by the Apriori algo-
rithm used in frequent set mining. The Apriori algo-
rithm is a fast, greedy, “bottom-up” approach to deter-
mining item sets with minimal support [1]. It achieves
its speed through a priori elimination of certain subopti-
mal item sets. Similarly, our algorithm eliminates some
(p,q) pairs through a priori knowledge about the sample.
Instead of exhaustively considering each feature pair
(p,q), we rank the elements in the feature set Γ by the
value of the Jacobian at that coordinate. (This is the con-
tribution each element makes to α in Algorithm 1.) We
then force the choice of p to be from the best k such
features and select q from the entire feature set with p
removed. Since this choice of p means its contribution
to α is large, it is likely the product −α×β will also be
large.
Thus, we omit a large number of the (p,q) fea-
ture pairs through a priori knowledge derived from our
heuristic. This alternative to Algorithm 1 is shown in Al-
gorithm 2. If we denote K = arg topp∈Γ
(
− ∂F j(X)∂Xi ; k
)
,
where arg topx∈A ( f (x); k) is the set consisting of the top
k elements in A as ranked by f , then the loop in our Fast
Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori (FJSMA) selection rou-
tine runs in Θ(|K| · |Γ|) time, where |K|  |Γ|. Since de-
termining the top k features can be done in Θ(|Γ|) time,
this is a net improvement in asymptotic terms.
4.3 Experimental Results
The improved speed of FJSMA when compared to JSMA
is especially beneficial in the real-time environment of
ADVERSARIAL-PLAYGROUND. Low-latency genera-
tion of adversarial inputs provides a much better user ex-
perience for this case.
Algorithm 2 Fast Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori Fea-
ture Selection
∇F(X), Γ, and t as in Algorithm 1, k is a small constant
Input: ∇F(X), Γ, t, k
1: K = arg topp∈Γ
(
− ∂Ft (X)∂Xp ; k
)
2: for each pair (p,q) ∈ K×Γ, p 6= q do
3: α = ∑i=p,q
∂Ft (X)
∂Xi
4: β = ∑i=p,q∑ j 6=t
∂F j(X)
∂Xi
5: if α < 0 and β > 0 and −α×β > max then
6: p1, p2← p,q
7: max←−α×β
8: end if
9: end for
10: return p1, p2
However, while the theory suggests that FJSMA will
run faster than JSMA and generate evading samples at
a similar rate, we must verify this with experimentation.
We compare our FJSMA implementation (using a variety
of values for k and ϒ) to the implementation of JSMA
found in Cleverhans [4] as of April 5, 2017.
We compared both evasion algorithms using the
MNIST dataset and TensorFlow tutorial implementation
of a MNIST-specific CNN. After training the CNN net-
work on the MNIST training set, we ran both evasion
attacks on the 10000-sample MNIST testing. To evalu-
ate the performance of each approach, we compared the
evasion rate — the percentage of seed images that were
successfully converted into evasive samples. This is the
standard metric used to evaluate evasion algorithms. We
want to verify that our FJSMA algorithm is faster than
JSMA and evades the classifier at a similar rate.
We determined the evasion rate for a range of values
of the ϒ parameter. With the FJSMA algorithm, we also
varied the value of k to be used; to represent the perfor-
mance for arbitrarily-sized feature sets, we set k in this
experiment to be a percentage of the feature set size. In-
tuitively, this k value is a control on how tight of an ap-
proximation FJSMA is to JSMA; as k grows larger, we
should expect the performance of the two approaches to
converge to each other.
Results of this experiment are summarized in Figure
3a. The cleverhans JSMA and the new FJSMA attack
perform similarly for all tested values of ϒ and k, with
larger values of k increasing the evasion rate. Curiously,
for k≥ 20%, our implementation of FJSMA outperforms
that of cleverhans; this is likely due to implementation
details4.
4The original preprint reported different results; at that time, we
relied on high-level Python constructs for much of the algorithm. Now,
we use lower-level numpy functions, resulting in a much faster runtime.
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Figure 3: Experiment Results
(a) Comparison of Evasion Rates
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(b) Time for successful sample generation
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In addition to evasion rate, we measured the “wall
clock” time needed for successfully generating evasive
samples. The average time to form an evasive sample
from the original, benign sample is summarized in Figure
3b. We see that our FJSMA approach greatly improves
upon the speed of a similarly written JSMA. However,
it seems that varying the value of k does not produce a
significant variation in runtime per sample. We conjec-
ture this results from the small size of the feature space
in MNIST and that searching 30% of the feature space
likely does not dominate the runtime not large.
5 Discussion and Future Work
The study of evasion attacks on machine learning mod-
els is a rapidly growing field. In this paper, we present a
web-based tool for visualizing the performance of eva-
sion algorithms for deep neural networks. This helps
both researchers and students alike to understand and
compare the impact of adversarial examples against
DNNs. Furthermore, we provide an improvement to the
Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) originally de-
veloped by Papernot, et al. [8]. This improvement, which
we call the Fast Jacobian Saliency Map Apriori (FJSMA)
approach, uses an a priori heuristic to reduce the search
space significantly. FJSMA achieves a significant im-
provement in speed, while maintaining essentially the
same evasion rate — an important advantage for visu-
alization.
A straightforward extension of this work is to increase
the variety of supported evasion methods. For example,
including the new attacks based on L0, L2, and L∞ norms
from Carlini and Wagner’s recent paper [3] would be a
good step in comparing the performance of multiple eva-
sion strategies.
However, expansion in this manner presents an addi-
tional issue of latency. To generate evading samples “on-
demand,” the adversarial algorithm must run quickly;
these other algorithms take much longer to execute than
those we selected. A possible fix is to pre-compute re-
sults for slower methods with a selection of hyperparam-
eter values, rather than allowing any value for hyperpa-
rameters. Another approach is to attempt applying the
same greedy approximation technique used in FJSMA to
the other attack algorithms; however, this may not always
be possible.
Another direction for development is to provide a
choice of classifiers and datasets. Allowing the user to
select from CIFAR, ImageNet, and MNIST data would
highlight the similarities and differences between how a
single attack method deals with different data. Similarly,
providing the user with a choice of multiple pre-trained
models — possibly hardened against attack through ad-
versarial training — would help distinguish artifacts of
model choice from the behavior of the attack. These two
extensions would help users more fully understand the
behavior of an adversarial algorithm.
References
[1] AGRAWAL, R., AND SRIKANT, R. Fast algorithms
for mining association rules in large databases. In
7
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases (San Francisco, CA,
USA, 1994), VLDB ’94, Morgan Kaufmann Pub-
lishers Inc., pp. 487–499.
[2] BARRENO, M., NELSON, B., JOSEPH, A. D.,
AND TYGAR, J. The Security of Machine Learn-
ing. Machine Learning 81, 2 (2010), 121–148.
[3] CARLINI, N., AND WAGNER, D. Towards eval-
uating the robustness of neural networks. CoRR
abs/1608.04644 (2016).
[4] GOODFELLOW, I. J., PAPERNOT, N., AND MC-
DANIEL, P. D. cleverhans v0.1: an adversarial
machine learning library. CoRR abs/1610.00768
(2016).
[5] GOODFELLOW, I. J., SHLENS, J., AND SZEGEDY,
C. Explaining and harnessing adversarial exam-
ples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572 (2014).
[6] KRIZHEVSKY, A., SUTSKEVER, I., AND HIN-
TON, G. E. ImageNet Classification with Deep
Convolutional Neural Networks. In Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems (2012),
pp. 1097–1105.
[7] MICROSOFT CORPORATION. Mi-
crosoft Malware Competition Challenge.
https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification,
2015.
[8] PAPERNOT, N., MCDANIEL, P. D., JHA, S.,
FREDRIKSON, M., CELIK, Z. B., AND SWAMI,
A. The limitations of deep learning in adversarial
settings. CoRR abs/1511.07528 (2015).
[9] PARKHI, O. M., VEDALDI, A., AND ZISSERMAN,
A. Deep Face Recognition. In British Machine
Vision Conference (2015).
[10] SZEGEDY, C., ZAREMBA, W., SUTSKEVER, I.,
BRUNA, J., ERHAN, D., GOODFELLOW, I. J.,
AND FERGUS, R. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. CoRR abs/1312.6199 (2013).
[11] YOSINSKI, J., CLUNE, J., NGUYEN, A. M.,
FUCHS, T. J., AND LIPSON, H. Understanding
neural networks through deep visualization. CoRR
abs/1506.06579 (2015).
8
